Multiple Faces of the Welfare Party’s Approach to the Kurdish Question

This paper discusses the approaches developed by the Welfare Party (WP) towards the Kurdish Question until its dissolution by the Constitutional Court in January 1998. In the first part, I examine WP’s critique of Turkish modernization as a catalyst for Kurdish nationalism in relation with the party’s approach to Kurdish identity. Secondly, I analyze the causes of the fluctuation in the party’s discourse by problematizing the party’s understanding of Ummah and Turkish nationalism and relations with the Turkish military.

In the second part, I examine the different approaches developed by the party towards the Kurdish question .  In the first place, I analyze and decode   the party’s developmental discourse that is two-dimensional; economic development –including education, and moral development. While this approach presents us the WP perceived the Kurdish question as a problem of underdevelopment, the party was far from having the power to implement its solutions. In the second place, I will examine the party’s security discourse in three areas:  a) “foreign dark powers”, b) “State of Emergency Rule, i.e. criticism of security forces/village guards” and c) use of “excessive force” by the Turkish state. Finally, I show why and how the party’s approaches towards the Kurdish question were inconsistent.
Key words: [Welfare Party, Kurdish question, securitization, Turkish military, Ummah, political discourse]
With the end of the Cold War which opened religious and ethnic identities to debate, Turkey had to confront its so called two ‘imagined’ enemies(Yavuz, 1996). The Welfare Party (hereafter WP), established in 1983 after the 1980 coup d’état and led by Necmettin Erbakan, was a building block in the National Outlook Movement. Since the 1970s, the National Outlook Movement received  a significant proportion of the votes in the Southeastern and Eastern parts of Turkey where most of the Kurdish people lived (Duran, 1998), except for the 1991 elections in which the party allied with the Nationalist Labor Party (NLP) and Reformist Democracy Party (RDP) (Çakır, 1994).
After gaining momentum in 1994 local elections, the WP received 21.38% of the votes and gained 158 seats in the 550 seat in Parliament in 1995 national elections(Turkish Assembly). The significance of this election stems from the WP’s competition with HADEP which was the successor of DEP- a party believed to represent the Kurdish people. While 36 candidates with Kurdish origin entered the parliament from the lists of WP, HADEP remained under the ten per cent election threshold- a legal mechanism of the state to block ‘imagined enemies’ from the political arena.
When the Welfare Party entered the parliament through free elections, the Kurdish question was deteriorating due to the state of emergency rule, the village guards system and the ongoing migration of Kurdish people both from Iraq and Eastern parts of Turkey because of increasing violence and evacuation of villages especially by the state[1]. While both the Kurdish people and the WP criticized the establishment and practices of the Turkish nation-state, their meeting point was the WP since it was in the political system and offered an alternative civilizational order called Just Order.
Given the relationship between the WP and Kurdish people, one expects the Welfare Party to have a plan or program regarding the Kurdish question. However, such a program was not proposed ever which is an anomaly. This study problematizes this anomaly and addresses the following questions: Why the Welfare Party had an inconsistent discourse and did not have a program regarding the Kurdish Question? How did its relations with Turkish nationalism and the military affect its approach? Which different perspectives were employed and how?
To answer these questions, this study will discuss Welfare Party’s criticism of the Turkish modernization which, in party’s view, gave birth to Kurdish nationalism. Secondly, the ‘‘developmentalist’’ discourse of the WP will be analyzed. Thirdly, the security (and related) approaches which were employed by the WP will be studied in relation to Poised Hammer, a combined task force deployed in northern Iraq after the first Gulf War in 1991.
WP’s Critique of Turkish Modernization as a Catalyst for Kurdish Nationalism
Before discussing the WP’s criticism of Turkish modernization, it should be mentioned that the state implemented a policy of ‘Turkification’ towards religious and ethnic entities throughout Republic’s history. While all of the Muslim people- be Kurd, Turk, Arab, Sunni or Alawi were subject to this policy, the Turkish state ‘refused’ and ‘negated’ Kurdish identity as an ethnic identity (Southeastern problem in state discourse) until the 1990s (Yeğen, 2011) and even in the 1990s[2].
The Welfare Party’s criticism of Turkish modernization can be traced in two different trajectories; the Turkish-nation state (nationalism, its practices and westernization) and Turkish identity. According to WP, secular nationalism has been an alien and divisive ideology for the Muslims. To the party, the most important base of ‘identity’ has always been ‘Islam’ (Hatipoğlu, 1992). The Ummah concept in Islam accepts the existence of different nations (asabiyya) but refuses a distinction based on ethnicity. In parallel, the WP tried to employ such universal concepts by refusing ‘national’ terms which are ‘constructed’ by the Kemalist nation state. As Duran argued, the WP was a continuum of a tradition challenging Kemalism and its policies which contributed to the development of its own Islamist identity (Duran, 1998).
Emphasizing its ‘Muslim’ identity rather than its ‘Turkishness,’ which clearly has an ethnic meaning, the party criticized Kemalism and has always rejected the nation-state concept in its discourse. Hatipoğlu, a politician close to Erbakan,  using an article written by M. Bruinessen which discuss the abolition of caliphate and the rise of Kurdish nationalism in relation with Sheikh Said rebellion of 1925 (Bruinessen, 1991)  argued that this rebellion was in an Islamic character rather than ethno nationalist one (Hatipoğlu, 1992).  By doing so, Hatipoğlu underestimated the emergence and rise of Kurdish nationalism in the late 19th and early 20thcenturies. Reading between the lines, he claimed that Turkish modernization-and therefore Turkish nationalism caused the birth of Kurdish nationalism. However, May the rise of the Kurdish nationalism not be a natural outcome of a historical process?
Such ideas were reinforced by Erbakan when he underlined the materialist and racist character of Turkish nationalism as creator of its twin sister (Kurdish nationalism) in his keynote speech of the 4thGeneral Congress of the WP (Çalmuk, 2001).  Furthermore, the WP questioned Turkish nation state establishment and its nationalism in various ways. For instance, the definition of the Turkish citizenship, in theory, argues that everyone bound to the Turkish state through the bond of citizenship is a Turk. For the WP this definition ignores various people’s ethnic origins thereby refusing the Kurdish ethnicity (Çakır, 1994; Çalmuk, 2001). For example, Erbakan, in one of his speeches in 1994, argued that if the state wrote everywhere Ataturk’s words, ‘How happy he/she is, who says I am a Turk’ or children in schools are required to chant, ‘I am a Turk, honest, hardworking’ then a Kurd has the right to say that ‘I am a Kurd, more honest and more hardworking’ (Çakır, 1994). This statement by nature challenges Kemalism and may be interpreted as an acceptance of the ‘Kurdish identity[3]’. But, what type of ‘identity’ recognition was this?
Although the WP recognized the ‘Kurdish (national) identity’ in its reports and publications, it should be noted these reports handled the issue differently. The first report published in 1992 was an attempt to have a program to embrace Kurdish people who distanced themselves from the party because of the famous alliance with Turkish nationalist parties NLP and RDP. Given the importance of this report, it did not only criticize the practices of the state –rejection of Kurdish identity, prohibition of speaking Kurdish, exercise of excessive violence and etc.- but also offered a vision to WP. This report stated that the WP should be brave to use the word ‘Kurd’, recognize the Kurdish identity, support broadcasting and education in Kurdish, and perceive the problem not as a ‘South Eastern,’ but a ‘national’ one. The report suggested a new approach which relied on ‘equal social, cultural and political rights for all people’ should be applied[4].
On the other hand, Hatipoğlu argued that promising to accept Kurdish identity, allowing broadcasting and education in Kurdish and giving cultural rights per se is not a solution. Believing such measures would be populist policies, he argued that the problem is not being Kurdish or Turkish but the state’s approach to protect its own institutions.  Not surprisingly, this perspective deduced that the solution lies in Islamic ummah consciousness (Hatipoğlu, 1992) which is an Islamic cement since it homogenizes people.  Such a perspective, although it mentions some inequalities, shows us the reluctance of the party to acknowledge ‘ethnic Kurdish identity’ in a possible conciliation. Furthermore, mentioning cultural rights without explaining  their content (Duran, 1998), Erbakan claimed such rights could only be ‘given’ when the unity of the country is guaranteed and the Just Order established (Çakır, 1994).  As it is seen, the WP wanted the Kurds to guarantee the unity of the nation and to wait for the Just Order which was claimed to be an alternative to the political order of the time and was based on the concept of ummah and justice in Islamic terms.
            Interpreting the WP’s concept of ummah, Bora argues that  the WP’s  understanding of ummah is Turkey centered and Turkey is seen as the leader of the Muslim world(Bora, 1996).  Considering Erbakan’s perspective from this point of view, it is crystal clear that the WP had a nationalistic stance towards the Kurdish question. Furthermore, by accepting the Turkish nation state as its operational framework(Duran, 1998) the WP  played the game according to the rules of Kemalism. That means although the party offered an alternative order, it was already part of the political system in Turkey and Turkish nationalism was central to Muslim psyche.
A Period of Ups and Downs of WP
The Welfare Party’s discourse and practice resembles a significant fluctuation and ups and downs as a result of the changing political context, its ummah and nationalism perception, and pressures and challenges posed by the military.
In the 4thGeneral Congress of the Welfare Party in 1994, Necmettin Erbakan separated the Kurdish issue into three related aspects; a) the problem of terrorism, b) the Kurdish cultural identity problem and c) the problem of Southeast, e.g. economic underdevelopment(Duran, 1998). For Erbakan, the state, by seeing the issue as a taboo exacerbated the problem. Every resolution suggestion could be discussed in a free environment; however the solution must fit with the realities of the region.
Separating the issue into three topics, Erbakan showed how the party perceived the Kurdish question at that time. It should be noted that the problem of terrorism was seen more as a security issue rather than a significant catalyst of Kurdish nationalism. Furthermore, the problem of Southeast which refers to economic underdevelopment shows us that the WP thought this problem could be approached in terms of employment and an increase in the welfare level.  Indeed, although underdevelopment contributed to the exacerbation of the Kurdish question, these measures would not respond the problem since the Kurdish nationalism gained momentum and the Kurdish people demanded more political rights rather than economic improvements. Moreover, by claiming that a prospective ‘resolution’ should fit in the regional realities which means no autonomy or disintegration could be accepted and the resolution should be Islamic, Erbakan was not leaving much space for other alternative ‘resolutions’.
Remarkably, Erbakan’s speech in the 4th Congress of the party was with little make-up, published as an election booklet in 1995. This booklet ignored the removal of MPs from the parliament affiliated with DEP in 1994 (Democracy Party) –a party which is believed to represent Kurdish people- and the employment of the military option regarding the ‘low intensity conflict’. The attempt to lift the immunity of MPs of DEP was a real test for the WP to show its approach towards the Kurdish problem. The party and its leadership presented a weak and completely incoherent attitude. While some MPs voted in favor of DEP, the ‘reformists’ voted against and a group, including Erbakan, did not attend the voting. A few years later, Abdullah Gül, now President of Republic of Turkey, would claim that they voted in favor of the MPs of DEP who were not affiliated with PKK and against the others. That is a significant indication of mental approach of WP since it fits in the party’s concept of terrorism and identifying the DEP and PKK.
This was not WP’s first turn back from the Kurdish people; the same scenario was staged in 1986 after the Halapja Massacre when the party remained silent despite protesting the massacres in the Balkans in 1990s. Furthermore, Çalmuk argues that Şevket Kazan, vice president of WP at that time,  was asked to get a party decision and voted ‘no’ to the alignment with ultra-nationalists, but Kazan mentioned the ‘military pressure’. Indeed, the party did not voice its perception that the DEP was a rival. The removal of the DEP meant that the party would not be outvoted since no Kurdish affiliated party could enter in the parliament due to the ten percent election threshold.
The third report published in 1994 after the victory of the WP in local elections and when the party was still in opposition. This report was a result of the increasing interest of WP in the Kurdish problem and revealed the problems of the region by using a ‘soft’ language towards the military. Also, Erbakan did not hesitate to defend the army sometimes(Duran, 1998) and there was no reaction when the military accused the party as being a virus transmitted to the state(Çalmuk, 2001).  While doing this, the WP tried to be ‘compassionate’ towards the Kurds which would help the party to come to power.
The party’s 5thGeneral Congress which was held when it was in power (June 96-97) stated only that the terrorism problem should be solved as a result of the increasing pressures from the military establishment. In addition, Erbakan claimed that the WP was the true ‘Ataturkist’ and gave ‘secular’ messages which show a clear u-turn. The military establishment used the party’s Islamic stance and discourse on Kurdish question to manipulate the political area and proposed ‘Laiklik elden gidiyor’ (secularism to be lost) to force the party to withdraw.
Furthermore, the 54thgovernment led by Erbakan emphasized ‘providing opportunities to people to return their villages, opening of the borders and development of border trade, and the abolition of State of Emergency Governorships’(Hatipoğlu, 2008).  In addition to this, Erbakan stated that ‘‘we will not allow debates that weaken our security forces in the fight against terrorism’’(Duran, 1998) which is a clear proof of defending the military.
Interestingly, newspapers published in early August 1996 while the party was in power, announced that the WP initiated an indirect dialogue with PKK(Daily, 1996; Kul, 1996). Since it was argued that ‘the state cannot bargain with terrorists’ the negotiation process was managed by the WP. However, the military establishment, the then president Demirel, and the coalition partner and leader of the nationalist True Path Party, Çiller, bombarded the party’s plan and criticized the party harshly(Doğan, 1996; Milliyet, 1996). The unexpected demands (e.g. a unilateral cease-fire, foundation of federal state) of the PKK which the WP could not respond turned the process into failure. Furthermore, the party could not present the necessary skills to manage the process and to form public opinion which is crucial in such resolution processes.
Before moving onto the developmentalist approach and the security perspective, three remarks should be pointed out here. Firstly, in relation with the Turkey centered ummah concept, the alternative ‘nationalism’ constructed by the WP was a great obstacle to produce a concrete program on the Kurdish issue. Students of nationalism admit that one of the fundamental objectives of nationalism is to homogenize the society. Thus, WP’s nationalism concept also aimed at homogenizing the society with the discourse of changing the order and turning citizens into pious, honest, devoted Sunni Muslims. Bora demonstrated that the WP was in search of true (doğru) nationalism with an accurate (sahih) nation which can be found in Islam[5](Bora, 1996). This type of nationalism would be legitimate for Turkey since it would not originate from the West and since the ‘future is in our roots’ –meaning Turkey should follow an Islamic political model(Çınar, 1996).
Secondly, the WP’s state concept and relations with the military is another source of criticism. Sakallioglu argues that for Turkey’s Islamist tradition, the state has historically been conceptualized as a ‘sanctified entity, as sublime and eternal, commanding strict loyalty and obedience to the ruler’(Sakallioglu, 1998). Although the WP criticized the nation state and its western attitude, the state continued to be central to Muslim psyche. It means that even though the WP criticized the state, the party did not waver in its love for state. For example, a Konya MP of WP argued that ‘Our state has a great historical past. Our Nation is among the Great Nations who institutionalized and organized states’(Dinç, 2006). A concept attached to this sanctified state understanding is territorial integrity. In almost every report published by the WP on Kurdish issue, the WP claimed that these ethnic distinctions are against ummahunderstanding and argued that territorial disintegration could not be accepted.
Finally, the WP followed a low profile against the military establishment and did not challenge it as a result of the sacred state perception and the party’s will to have no problem with the military since it feared to be left out of the political system. In addition, Turkish public has always perceived the military establishment as the guardian of the secular state regime which undermined the WP’s criticisms of the military since the party was seen as a threat to the political system. Therefore, though the party employed a critical discourse towards the Kurdish question, in practice it remained unfruitful and inconsistent due to the abovementioned restrictions and chains.
Looking at the Kurdish Question via a Developmental Perspective
Analyzing the discourses of the political parties related to the Kurdish problem in the Turkish parliament between 1990 and 1999, Akın Unver, tests the discursive context choices by party affiliation. This test shows us that MPs of the WP   emphasized especially, among human rights, democracy, ethnic differences, a developmental and a security related discourse(Ünver, 2010). The developmental discourse of WP is two-dimensional; economic development –including education, and moral development.
The National Outlook Movement has always used a discourse of development and initiated programs. The first one was initiated by Erbakan in 1976 which is called ‘Heavy Industry Onset’ and aimed at opening factories especially in the Eastern and Southeastern parts of the country. By building 47 factories, the party (MSP at the time) claimed that the state would employ 36,021 people and contribute to the development of the region(Akdoğan, 2000). Although some of these factories were constructed and remained active for some time, in 1990s many in the Southeast were either converted into gendarmerie stations or were privatized.  Erbakan, in one of his speeches in the parliament in 1992, stated that the state initiated no ‘investment’ in the region and rather it closed the  open factories (Erbakan, 1992).Therefore, the Kurdish question deteriorated and more despaired people joined the PKK.
Throughout the 1990s, the party believed that unemployment, lack of opportunities and investments caused significant amount of migration to western cities, exacerbating the region’s economy and leaving agriculture as its primary economic engine(Çakır, 1994). It was argued that a special program should be prepared to repopulate the evacuated villages. However, the content of the program remained unclear and no concrete plans were made. To argue that the WP benefited this ambiguity would not be wrong since the party did not plan any concrete action to fulfill its promises but demanded votes of the Kurdish people.
In 1996, criticizing the government’s policies and the GAP (Southeastern Anatolia Project), Erbakan stated that the state had to spend an additional $3.5 billion on top of $5.5 that already being spent. As Unver presented the items on Erbakan’s ‘counter-terror’ list concerned the development of the region but was slightly suggesting a re-allocation of the military budget into the subsidies left for the region(Ünver, 2010). Although this criticism of Turkish military, which had large portions of the budget, was significant at that time, it shows us how Erbakan, by focusing on economic backwardness, did not want to break his relation with the military. Furthermore, the WP argued that the village guard system which had its own huge economy should be re-designed and officials who knew the region should be employed(Çalmuk, 2001). As it was seen, the WP was not against this village guard system but to its implementation and the huge amounts of funding it received.
Later on, the party emphasized the correlation between the decrease in economic indicators and the rise of terrorism(Hatipoğlu, 1996). The party proposed measures ranging from cooperation with Iraq and Iran against terrorism to abolition of the state of emergency. However, as it happened in many attempts of the party, no economic or social measures could be launched since no concrete program was issued. Furthermore, the military establishment which was responsible on the war against terrorism at that time would not accept such changes.
The other dimension of the developmental discourse was education. Since it was believed that the PKK was attracting people who were uneducated and ignorant, the solution was sought to increase educational development. Furthermore, the WP in its 1994 Southeast Report argued that experienced instructors and teachers should be appointed to the region since they could contact students and their families in a constructive way and promote peaceful coexistence(Yayman, 2011). Indeed, the real reason was that the Turkish teachers were imposing ‘Turkishness’ as the curriculum commanded and the ‘national’ education was centralized[6]. In the 1996 Southeastern Report of the party, this point was mentioned and it was proposed that instructors who had local religious education should be given the status of İmam Hatip Lisesi (Preacher High School) graduate after a vocational examination, and be recruited by the state(Yayman, 2011). It is obvious that ‘personification’ was a fundamental factor which was expected to result in ‘less’ problem in the region and contribute to its development. Furthermore, the objective in recruiting religious instructors was to raise morale against PKK which had a communist stance and thereby decreasing support to the outlawed organization.
Waving the Kurdish Question from the Security Perspective
The Welfare Party’s discourse of security includes many aspects not only because of the party’s own attitude but also because of the Operation Provide Comfort and the state’s implementation of low intensity conflict concept. The security discourse consists of ‘foreign dark power’, ‘State of Emergency Rule, i.e. criticism of security forces/ village guards’ and usage of ‘excessive force’ by the state.
To begin with, using the foreign dark powers discourse as a reason of the Kurdish problem is a pastime of Turkey’s political parties. Being the most influential party in the National Outlook Movement, the Welfare Party and its leader always mentioned such an external influence on the Kurdish problem[7].  According to Erbakan, the western powers always aimed to keep Turkey underdeveloped to facilitate the exploitation of Turkish natural resources(Erbakan, 1991).  This discourse shows us that the WP is bound to the traditional way of accusing someone rather than offering a concrete policy. Furthermore, a careful observer would highlight how this discourse created a nationalist sentiment among the followers of the party. Accordingly, although the party objected to the Poised Hammer, the WP had to accept renewal of its duration because of the state’s ‘interests’. It was the military’s influence on decision making process which co-opted governments to ratify the renewal of the duration of Poised Hammer. However, the WP’s patriotism and nationalism helped the military to get a result easily since opposition would undermine the WP’s legitimacy.
To elaborate on other aspects of the security discourse, the Turkish state implemented the State of Emergency Rule to the Kurdish problem from June 1987 to 2002. The objective was to combat the increasing terror events which took place since 1984 in the Southeastern provinces of the country which were led by the PKK. The WP’s attitude has always been critical but cautious to the implementation and administration of this law. For example, Hatipoğlu questioned the unknown murders in the region with a soft language asking whether PKK or other powers did such things in 1992(Hatipoğlu, 1992).  Indeed, the state was self denying since lately it was found the special forces initiated such operations.
Subsequently, Erbakan claimed that the state of emergency should be abolished in his receipt of counter terrorism. In parallel with this, a commission of MPs of WP   visited the region and argued that the state of emergency became an extraordinary sector in the region implying the economic opportunities given the state officials in the region. Furthermore, the report criticized the village guard system which only exacerbated the issue by creating a group of people enjoying economic opportunities and behaving as ‘the state’ itself while other Kurdish people suffered from economic problems and were subject to excessive use of force. Not surprisingly, these measures did not take place in the program of the 54th government. What does this inconsistent security approach mean?
As it is seen, the WP tried not to challenge the military seriously. In relation with this security issue and in general, the WP, interestingly, felt that it has to prove itself to the state (reminiscent of most right wing parties in Turkey) and therefore its institutions, especially military and bureaucracy. This feeling led the party not only to use a cautious language but also to behave in an inconsistent way.
The last pillar of the security discourse of the WP is the criticism of the excessive force. In 1992, the military carried out an operation in the province of Sırnak and most of the houses were damaged whereas public buildings were not. What was interesting is that the villagers argued that they did not see any terrorists and no terrorist could be caught in the operation. Visiting the province, the Commission of the WP reported the security forces were using excessive force towards the civilians and there was no distinction between civilians and ‘terrorists’.  What the party offered  to prevent these problems was  to employ faithful officials who would not perceive the citizens as potential ‘threats’ or ‘terrorists’ and the cessation of the actions of the special forces who promoted racist ideas instead of providing safety(Yayman, 2011). These suggestions were repeated in the party’s further reports but remained unfruitful as a result of the military establishment’s domination of political system and the party’s impotence.
In conclusion, Welfare Party’s inconsistent approaches to the Kurdish problem derives from its efforts to deal with the problem without a concrete program, the influence of Turkish nationalism on the party, its relations with Turkish military. The Welfare Party presented its raison d’être by criticizing the state’s policies and above all nature on the one hand, and  it  confronted the dilemma of finding  legitimization in the state structure that it criticized.
Although the party criticized the Turkish modernization (westernization) and instead advanced the ummah concept, it could not offer a different perspective rather than Islamic solution due to the following reasons; blessing the state as a result of the Islamic tradition, playing the game on the grounds of Turkish nationalism and its relations with the military establishment. Furthermore, as the issue exacerbated and the PKK reacted, the party focused more on economic problems of the Southeast due to the increasing pressure from the army in order to stay in the political system, and   because of its will to prove itself to the established regime. However, the army and other secular forces manipulated the political arena by claiming that the party wanted to change the secular regime of the state. The army initiated a post-modern coup and the Constitutional Court dissolved the party in 1997.
Duran, B. (1998). Approaching the Kurdish question via adil düzen: an Islamist formula of the welfare party for ethnic coexistence. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 18(1), 111-128. Erbakan, N. (1991). Türkiye’nin Meseleleri ve Çözümleri: Program (Turkey’s Problems and Solutions: A Program). Ankara: Baybars Kitabevi.

[1]  The village guard system aimed at   protecting the life and properties of the villagers against the outlawed Kurdish terrorist organization, PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan). However,  the  system was under control of some local authorities who misused their powers and gained many economic benefits which turned the system into  a significant economic sector(Bayramoğlu & İnsel, 2009). In addition, the PKK  used violence against villages who accepted this system  and forced the villagers  either to reject this system or leave their villages(Kurban, Yükseker, Çelik, Ünalan, & Aker, 2006).
[2]According to a report submitted to National Security Council (NSC, MGK) of Turkey in 2008, there are more than 12 million Kurds in Turkey. The same report, as it was argued in the newspaper, presents us that almost 2, 5 million Kurds are ‘Turkified’ or ‘in process of being Turkified’.  Retrieved 06/05/2011, from
[3]Erbakan was on trial because of these words and was fined  ‘because of  his divisive discourse’. This means that he supported Kurdism (Kürtçülük yapmak) which was a ‘crime’ against the state at that time.
[4]Although various authors like Duran, Çakır and Dinç  focus on the report published  in 1992 by the party’s Istanbul Provincial Organization, Çalmuk argues that Erbakan, indeed, did  not  embrace the report and asked Ö. V. Hatipoğlu to write a book on the issue. A striking point in Hatipoğlu’s book worth mentioning is that only Erbakan’s and Hatipoğlu’s ideas are presented (Çalmuk, 2001).
On the other hand, Hüseyin Yayman claims that this report was prepared for intra-party discussions and therefore could not bring path breaking criticisms against the state (Yayman, 2011).
[5]The WP in its 1992 constitutional  amendment  proposal  argued that article 58 of the constitution should be replaced with a new one in order to raise a youth bound to ‘national’ and ‘moral’ values(Kazan, 2001).
[6]  For a valuable discussion of  Turkish national education policies  after 1980s  please  see(Kaplan, 2006).
[7]According to Akın Unver, the WP  used this discourse 91 times two times more than any political party  and  the state (45) (Unver, 2009).